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ABSTRACT 
The study deals with the analysis of the most suitable configuration for positioning the 
fireworks containers in the cargo ship in order to minimize the risks for the ship in case of an 
accident (transmission of fire or deflagration originating from containers filled with fireworks 
devices to other containers or arising from other containers to the those containing fireworks). 
The analysis has been done in a three steps process 
1) What are the hazards coming from a fireworks container in case of fire? 
2) How to fill the containers it in order to minimize the outer effects? 
3) Where to place them on the ship from a safety management viewpoint? 
In this paper, we present;   The most dangerous fireworks,  Some incidents that occurred in the past and lessons learnt  The problems linked to inappropriate classification of the fireworks,  The hazards linked to confinement and the propagation issues,  Some proposals for safe filling of the containers in terms of types of fireworks under 
consideration, quantities, segregation rules and training of operators   Some proposals for safe filling and packing of fireworks  articles in inner packaging 
according to their types,  A proposal for optimizing the position selection of the containers in the cargo ship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Most fireworks used in the European market are produced and imported from CHINA. As a 
consequence, maritime transport of those articles (as dangerous goods) is quite common and 
important. Approximately 8000 (equivalent twenty feet) containers are imported each year in 
Europe, representing 30% of the world fireworks market for maritime transportation of such 
products by cargo ships. 
As some serious accidents have been observed in the past years (see accidentology section of 
this paper), we have developed a risk based approach to define the best packing 
configurations inside the boxes, the best lay-out for boxes of fireworks inside the containers 
and ultimately the best positioning of maritime containers containing fireworks articles inside 
the cargo ship in order to reduce the risk of propagation of a fire coming from the fireworks 
containers or from another container. 
In the following sections, we present:  The most dangerous fireworks and the main risks affecting them  Some issues arising from past accidentology and handling instructions  The default fireworks classification table for transport and associated problems with 
inappropriate risk division classification  The hazards and risks presented by a container full of fireworks in boxes, probabilities, 
propagation and possible protection  Safe instructions during the container’s filing, operator’s training  General recommendations for transportation of fireworks on a cargo ship 
MAIN RISKS AND HAZARDS AFFECTING THE FIREWORKS 
Within the new 2007/23/EC European Directive, fireworks are classified into 4 categories 
(designated as F1 to F4) according to their powder weight and operational effects when 
functioning. But the main risks cannot be ranked simply accordingly to this individual 
classification scheme. Indeed, main risks are caused by  The type of pyrotechnic compositions inside the fireworks and their degree of confinement: 
all fireworks are made with an assembly of different inert elements, each containing one or 
more different pyrotechnic compositions, in charge of one effect during the functioning of 
the firework (igniting, ejection, delay, exploding, colours, other visual or sound effects,...). 
Each composition is a mixture of powders which enables the composition to ensure its 
function (oxidizing carrier, fuel carrier, colorant, binder,..). These compositions can be 
classified according to their sensitivity to external aggressions and according to their effect 
on the environment. The following charts present the percentages of accidents induced by 
pyrotechnic compositions in function of the type of aggression, and the main causes of 
accident are clearly the mechanic aggressions (shocks, friction, indentation, drops, 
crushing, ...) 
  
Figure 1 :Accidents per causes 
If we classify the composition according to their actual hazards (as quantified by a severity 
index), the most dangerous reveal to be those containing chlorate or perchlorate /metal 
based compositions (metal elements are generally magnesium, aluminium, or titanium, in 
fine powders) 
 
Figure 2: Severity of accidents per type of composition  The density of composition inside the packaging, and consequently the confinement inside 
the packaging: fireworks, according to their type, confinement or quantities, can have 
different behaviours; mass explosion (maroons, big shells or roman candles), heavy 
thermal effect (fountains, Bengal, rockets) with a possibility of transition to a mass 
explosion in case of high storage density (see CHAF project results [1]), or light thermal 
effect only located in the immediate vicinity.  
 
 
 Some findings from past incidents/accidents  
The following table below contains an inventory of major accidents listed worldwide from 
1996 to 2004 (various sources; French inspection of explosives, incident log, ARIA database,  
...). This list is not exhaustive, the number of accidents in China appears as the highest as 
compared to incident numbers in other quoted countries, but this looks consistent with the  
very large number of manufacturers existing in this country and settled in 26 provinces 
(estimated to range from 4000 to 7000). The following table gives the number of fatalities 
listed by country and year worldwide (known accidents for which information is available). 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals  
India 25 10     30 22 50   21 5 163 
Kazakhstan         8          8 
Pakistan 13     8   19 6 38 8  92 
China 48 27 211 201 57 111 73 222 276 63 1289 
Japan         5 12        17 
Philippines           2 7      9 
Ceylon         1          1 
Thailand             15      15 
Dubai/EUA           8       2 10 
Taiwan       6 6 5 4      21 
Indonesia         12          12 
Brazil 54  5 3              62 
Mexico 36 56 1   12 41 4 9    159 
Argentina          1 1 
USA 7     1 1 125        134 
Peru       400    12        412 
Venezuela               28    28 
Guatemala       8            8 
Netherlands    22                22 
Spain     7             1 8 
Denmark 2           1      3 
Portugal       8       3    11 
Italy 3   3 4 3   5 3   3 24 
Turkey               6    6 
Hungary             2      2 
Slovakia       1            1 
France 3 1   1 2 1 2      10 
Total  163 105 225 638 135 358 166 309 315 75 2528 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 Among these accidents, very few deal with transport or storage of fireworks. The only known 
accident in a container ship is the HYUNDAI FORTUNE in 2006, 64 000 tonnes, bearing 
5100 containers (in equivalent 20 feet), when an explosion near the YEMEN coast caused a 
fire that lasted several days. The ship had a cargo of 7 fireworks containers located in the area 
of the fire, but the actual cause of the incident remains poorly identified. 
 
Figure 3: Fire in the Hyundai Fortune cargo ship 
Among recent accidents involving containers, the best-known is the one in the port of 
Changsha in 2006 where 200 containers have caused a significant fire after an explosion as 
initial event. 
 
Figure 4: Fire in the Changsha harbour 
From the analysis of the accidental database, it comes out that:  accidents occurring during a sleeping fireworks storage are limited   key factors of accidents are products handling in unsuitable packaging (cardboard boxes 
containing fireworks in bulk for example),   the main causes of accidents are due to mechanical stresses on products, i.e. shock during 
transfers (shocks, drops, violent friction), or when manipulations violate security policies. 
The effect of temperature on shock sensitivity is also a factor to be taken into account. 
 The default fireworks classification table and associated problems with inappropriate 
risk division classification 
Among explosive products, fireworks form a specific category, characterized:   by the diversity of products existing on the market (hundreds of them), from the simple 
banger to shells deploying their effects during functioning at altitudes up to 800 metres,   by their partial use on the consumer market (therefore inducing possible sale by retail 
stores),  by specific legislations (European Directive 2007/23/EC, TDGs legislation).  
The Fireworks do not derogate from the pyrotechnic products classification rule. However, 
given the diversity of products and their packaging, an individual ranking of these products is 
not always possible in practice. To address this point a default classification has been set by 
the legislator (primarily as a recommendation in the UN model regulation for the transport of 
dangerous goods – the so-called orange book [4]), this classification is supposed to 
correspond to a worse case situation in terms of hazard ranking of the given fireworks. 
Fireworks assignment under N ° UN 0333, 0334, 0335, 0336 and 0337 can be done 
accordingly by analogy without having to run the test series 6 of the UN Manual of test and 
criteria [5]. The applicant, in the event of disagreement with the classification given to the 
products by default, may request other classification through testing (according to test series 6 
procedure). 
This “by default” classification system scheme has been adopted in the IMDG as can be seen 
in its last edition 2009: see IMDG sections. 2.2.3.5.5, Amdt. 34-08). The classification in this 
table only applies to objects packed in cardboard boxes. The classification in risks division is 
intimately linked to the product packaging. Thus, for example, separation of fireworks in a 
box by the mean of bulkhead may change classification from division 1. 1 G to division 1. 3 
G or even to divisions from 1. 3 G to 1. 4 G. 
 Problems coming from the “by default” classification  
Because of the relatively low possibilities of maritime transport of class 1 products, and 
because of the lack of clear regulations concerning the classification of fireworks products 
(international rules said that such products should be classified using the same principles as 
for conventional explosive materials which had revealed to be largely enforceable in practice, 
because of the infinite variety of existing Fireworks), many exporters had tendency in the past 
to underestimate actual hazard ranking of such articles by using categories 1.3 or 1.4 instead 
of 1.1 and 1.3 or 1.2 categories.   
This has led in Europe to large capacity storages where lower risk category group than 
actually pertinent was in current use. This ended up with the occurrence of a few but 
extremely serious accidents that killed or endangered many people (Enschede in Netherlands, 
Kölding in Denmark...).  
These accidents have caused a violent reaction of authorities;   Establishment of a fireworks classification by default table for international transport,   Directive 2007/23/EC giving essential safety requirements for the placing on the European 
market of such articles,   Reconsider and upgrade security requirements of fireworks by re-labelling to appropriate 
risk level on arrival at the first European harbour (to be implemented by the importer, 
considering that the first hazard ranking performed in China is valid until the first storage 
place in Europe).   Currently in Amendment No 34-08 the IMDG, a commitment exists in the framework for 
multimodal transport of dangerous goods (5.4.5.1) formula in which the sender declares 
that cargo content is described as complete and accurate by the official designation of 
transport and that it is properly classified, packed, marked, labelled, affixed and in all 
respects well conditioned to be transported in accordance with international and national 
regulations apply.   
Despite of this commitment, the findings provided by audits carried out in harbours of 
Hamburg and Felixstowe by the competent authorities before unloading the ships showed that 
these fireworks either had not been classified at all or had been labelled as presenting the 
lowest risk level (1. 4 G) while in reality they belonged to a class of higher risk [3]. Law 
enforcement authorities in these ports have had to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
these products were properly classified to be delivered to their final destination. The 
classification was entrusted to European authorities and a large number of fireworks which 
had been declared belonging to class 1. 4 G or 1-3 G were then reclassified (1. 3 G, 1. 2 G / 1. 
1 G).  
Furthermore, another common distortion to actual regulations constraints consists simply in 
not considering classification of fireworks as hazard material of class 1, but to declare them as 
toys articles.  
Most of fireworks containers contain less than 8 tons Fireworks (5 tons net weight) splitting 
in between 5 and 20 different products. The additional information required for classification, 
as they are proposed above, should not impose an additional burden to the sender. 
 
 
 
 The hazards and related risks presented by a container full of fireworks packed in boxes 
 
The probability of occurrence of an accident can be determined by three different methods: 
semi-quantitative, qualitative or quantitative type.  The qualitative or intuitive method is 
based on a meaningful and representative feedback. The following data values were 
determined according to this method from the analysis of the available information on past 
accidents.  The semi-quantitative or empirical method is based on statistical data driven from 
accident databases. Quantitative or analytical method seeks to identify exhaustively possible 
causes (basic events) that lead to the feared hazardous event. The probability of the feared 
hazardous event is determined based on the probabilities of occurrence of the various causes 
that lead to this phenomenon (see table 1 below). 
Probability  Example of accidental event with fireworks  
P0 Accidental functioning in package accepted for transportation, during operations 
of loading/unloading, from time to time outside period of high activity 
P1 Accidental functioning in package accepted for transportation, during operations 
of loading/unloading and handling (package leakage, friction, shocks, drops, …)  
Accidental functioning of fireworks during operations of handling, sampling or 
dividing 
P2 Accidental functioning during linking of fireworks without any modification of 
product  
P3 Accidental functioning of igniters during electric testing or checking  
Table 2 
The above values are determined starting from the available accidentology.  
 
Table 2 below gives for each operation the probability of an accidental event during logistics 
operations regardless of the relevant division. 
 
Logistics operation Annual possibility of an accidental event 
Container loading 10-3 
Charging/discharging in the cargo ship  10-4 
Transportation 10-5 
Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Risk of fire/explosion propagation (domino effect)  
First case - reaction by influence of initial detonation (division 1.1)  
In the current state of knowledge, it is acceptable to say that the detonation of a given mass Q 
in kg  causes within 0.5 Q1/3 (expressed in metres) around this mass, the instantaneous 
 detonation of any mass able to explode (by Shockwave)   can lead to a distance (in meters) between 0.5 Q1/3 and 2.4 Q1/3, the almost simultaneous 
 detonation of any load which may explode (boot that often impact projections).   does not lead to simultaneous detonation:  
- beyond a distance in meters of 2.4 Q1/3, in this case, the remaining risk of initiating is 
always due to projections but it does not create enough pressure to ensure the transition 
to detonation;  
- beyond a distance in meters of 0.5 Q1/3, if the load exploding initially is separated 
from any other likely to explode by a screen or a sufficiently thick protection wall able 
to stop any projection  
Second case - materials or objects generating intense thermal effects (division 1. 3 a)  
1.3 Division products have propagation risks by thermal radiation and heat transfer that 
depend on:   Nature, weight and moisture of these products.   Their speed of combustion and therefore the duration of the initial accidental phenomenon.   The nature of their packaging.   The degree of containment.  
If they are placed in buildings covered with Earth and fitted with a discharge pressure door, 
these products involve risks of spreading very strongly increased in a zone of conical shape 
with their centre of gravity coinciding with the cone summit. This interpretation can be 
considered as valid for a container when the door opens as a result of the pressure.  
Third case - materials or objects with lower thermal radiation (division 1. 3b)  
A mass Q (expressed in kg) of products within division 1.3 (b) placed in a lightweight 
building or a container presents a risk of spreading up to one of the following distances: 
- 0.22 Q1/2 metres if Q is more than 13 000 kg 
- 25 metres if Q is less than 13 000 kg; for a small mass this distance may be reduced on 
justification 
- 10 metres if the mass Q is surrounded by a screen resistant to the effects of pressure 
and projections as well as thermal radiation.  
The above distances must be increased if substances or articles 1.3 Division are located in the 
presence of a significant quantity of flammable products (solvents, fuels...) which, by burning, 
emit a strong heat radiation, and are likely to encourage fire spread. Fireworks generally 
belong to the division 1.3b. 
Fourth case - materials or objects whose effects are limited (division 1.4) 
In this case, propagation of the accident beyond the original location of the initial event is 
always sufficiently slow so that people at risk can shelter. 
 
 Conclusions concerning the fireworks behaviour 
As concerning summary regarding fireworks hazardous behaviour, let us state they may be 
classified into 3 categories of behaviour for which specific recommendations can be made;   Fireworks experiencing explosive behaviour, even in limited quantities and in the absence 
of containment : the probability can be reduced by measures addressing adequate  filling of 
the containers (special containers with compartments, with limited quantities and/or 
separation by 1.4 division fireworks (or inert or a double wall) corresponding to a minimum 
distance of 0.5 Q1/3 between each 1.1 pallet,  Fireworks with behaviour that may become explosive if certain prevention measures are 
not taken (e.g. by limiting confinement and quantities to 50% of containers overall capacity)   Fireworks with intrinsic safer behavior (but that may render more severe the consequences 
of a fire coming from the outside) 
Annual probability of an accident can be estimated at 10-5 during transport, 10-4 during 
loading or unloading and 10-3 for filing. 
SAFE INSTRUCTIONS DURING THE CONTAINER’S FILING, OPERATOR’S 
TRAINING 
Beyond the intrinsic danger from products and explosive objects previously exposed, and 
taking account of fireworks behaviour in confined environment, it is important:  
- to limit the quantities loaded in order to limit the potential effects,  
- to choose packages as appropriate,  
- to wedge and store the fireworks inside the packages in order to limit all movement 
which could result in mechanical shock and/or thermal contact which could lead to an 
accidental event 
- to avoid the co-storage of incompatible materials.  
We present below existing regulatory demands as well as possible recommendations on the 
quantities to be loaded, type of packing preferred as well as the bulkhead which could be 
envisaged to limit the effects in the event of an accidental event occurrence in a container  
Accordance with IMDG AMdt 34-8  
Unless otherwise provided, the packs containing substances of class 1 shall comply with the 
provisions applicable to the Group of moderately hazardous materials (packing group II) 
(4.1.1.16)  
The table 3 below mentions (4.14.1) packing instruction required for each firework UN 
number which can be assigned to fireworks articles for their maritime transport. 
UN number Designation  Division  
Packing  
4.1.4.1 
0333 Fireworks 1.1G P135 
0334 Fireworks 1.2G P135 
0335 Fireworks 1.3G P135 
0336 Fireworks 1.4G P135 
0337 Fireworks 1.4S P135 
Table 3 
Packaging must comply with the General provisions of 4.1.1 (holding of shock to the usual 
demands on transport, packaging must not react dangerously with dangerous goods ….) and 
4.1.3 (Special packing provisions) as well as the provisions particular relating to the 
packaging of goods of class 1 mentioned in Chapter 4.1.5 of the IMDG code.  
 Packing instruction P135 shows the type of internal and external packaging that are allowed 
for maritime transport.  
Segregation of materials in the containers  
Incompatible materials must be separated from each other. Two materials or objects are 
considered incompatible when their stowage joint can cause excessive risks in the event of a 
leak or spill or other accident.  
This segregation may be obtained by separating incompatible materials in accordance with 
certain distances between dangerous goods or by requiring the presence among them one or 
more steel bulkheads or one or more steel bridges, or a combination of both. The intermediate 
spaces between these dangerous goods may be filled by another compatible with hazardous 
materials concerned cargo.  
The G and S compatibility groups can be loaded in the same container. Segregation rules 
concerning the loading of the fireworks in a container together with other dangerous goods is 
not permitted for divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 because the words "away from" are not listed in the 
table of contents separation for any class, nor in the list of dangerous goods.  
On the other hand, as a general rule, non-dangerous goods can be loaded together with 
fireworks. Beyond regulatory IMDG, type of packing preferred is proposed below.  
Maximum quantity in a container  
Aiming at limiting the overpressure effects of Fireworks Division 1.1 : 
To limit the overpressure effects, it is necessary to limit the quantity of products counted as 
net mass of explosives. If the fireworks container is surrounded by empty containers on each 
of its six sides, this corresponds to take a distance effect of 2.40 m (width of a container) and 
from the formula 0.5 Q1/3 it comes that the appropriate net weight limiting quantity for such a  
distance is Q = 110 kg. 
Limiting the thermal effects of Fireworks Division 1.3 : 
To limit the heating effects and if we limit the container loaded of fireworks by empty 
containers on each of its six sides, this corresponds to take a distance effect of 2.40 m (width 
of a container), and from the formula 0.22 Q1/2 to it comes that the appropriate net weight for 
such a distance is Q = 118 kg.  
To limit the Fireworks Division 1.3 behaviour to thermal effects, it is recommended to load 
the container at half of its overall capacity. A full load of the container could lead to a division 
1.1 with mass explosion behaviour and overpressure effects. Tests that confirm this statement 
were performed by CHAF (quantification and Control of the Hazards Associated with the 
transport and Bulk Storage of Fireworks)  
- on a 20 feet container containing 4 tons of 1.3G fireworks. A loud bang was observed 
with overpressure effects.  
- Containing 2 tons of 1.3 G fireworks with results limited to fire, and thermal effects. 
Test videos are online www.chaf.info site.  
We recommend the following combinations based on divisions with an indication of the 
maximum loading. The total quantity in net mass of fireworks by container 20 feet does not 
exceed 2 tons if containing 1.1G or 1.2G or 1.3G products (to multiply by 2 for 40 feet 
containers). 
 
  
Loading Division Maximum per load (net weight of pyrotechnic 
composition) 
 
Loading type 1 
1.1G Maximum 110 kg to avoid overpressure effects 
if surrounded by empty containers  
1.4G and/or 1.4S 1890 kg  
Or more if 1.1G is less than 110 kg  
Loading type 2 
1.3G or 1.2G < or equal to 2 tons max 
1.4G and/or 1.4S The remaining according to the quantity of 1.3G 
or 1.2G, until 2 tons max.  
Table 4 
Types of packaging preferred 
To avoid any movement of substances of class 1 inside the ship, storing packages in 
containers is an important element which will help limit unwanted event occurrences  
- Big size rockets should not be arranged in parallel rows inside the packages, but tumbled 
and layered perpendicular (to be sure all rockets heads are not located near each other)  
- Density of active material in boxes must be limited to 35 kg/m3 for the most sensitive 
fireworks (low confinement and high vivacity) and 90 kg/m3 for less sensitive fireworks 
(high confinement and medium vivacity), which determines the fill factor mass of active 
material (with the boundaries of the table above)  
- Spherical form fireworks (bombs, maroons) should be strictly compartmentalized with a 
housing for each fireworks, so that they cannot move and this also help to comply with the 
permitted maximum density  
- The fuses must be protected by a cover and arranged to avoid friction  
- The most sensitive fireworks may be transported either by bringing together and coping 
with non-propagation distances or by mixing with low sensitive fireworks (very high 
confinement and low vivacity) boxes or boxes filled with inert elements which may be 
considered as elements of bulkhead, or by using compartmentalized containers. 
Permissible amount of fireworks on a container ship 
No limit appears in the IMDG[2] about maximum quantities of dangerous goods that can be 
embedded on a ship that has less than 12 passengers.  
Limitation of the quantities of fireworks to load the container door therefore comes from ; 
- Restrictions on the limited quantities of explosives for temporary parking on land, which 
can be different in each harbour and ship loading docks 
- The ship document of compliance  
- The Dangerous Goods loading plan and safety distances corresponding to segregation 
rules as well as the distribution loads and stowage categories.  
 
 
 
 
 REGULATIONS FOR LOADING FIREWORKS IN A CARGO SHIP 
The table below lists, for each UN numbers that can be assigned to fireworks, the stowage 
category allowed to ships having on board a maximum of 12 passengers. 
Table 5 
In addition to these requirements, the IMDG lays down the following stowage provisions for 
class 1:  
- With the exception of goods Division 1.4, the class 1 goods must not be stowed on the 
rank the more outdoors,  
- The class 1 goods must be stowed in a fresh portion of the ship and kept cool as far as 
possible while they are on board,  
- They must be at least 3 m from any source of heat.  
- Compartments where they were strapped under deck must be dry.  
- Containers should be loaded and stowed securely to prevent moving during transport.  
- The class 1 goods must be stowed as far as possible of the accommodation zone and 
machinery rooms and must not be stowed directly above or below these premises.  
- They must be separated from those premises by a metallic partition.  
- Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 must not be stowed within 3 m of bulkhead. Idem on the deck, they 
must be stowed at 3 m from the vertical projection of the houses.  
- The class 1 goods must not be stowed in a horizontal distance of less than 6 metres of any 
fire, machines, kitchens, ventilation ducts, exhaust pipes of any other source of ignition. 
- These goods must always be stowed so as to not clutter up passages and be at least 3 m 
from all facilities necessary for safe operation of the ship and at least 8 m from gateway 
and salvation craft.  
- As a general rule, cables and electrical equipment must not be installed in the 
compartments to hold class 1. If they are present, however they must be isolated from the 
power source in order that no part of the circuit located in compartment is powered.  
- A lightning protection must be installed.  
- Compartments must be locked.  
- Instructions must be given to freight operators on the possible risks that may be presented 
by the class 1 goods and related necessary precautions.  
- Containers loaded with fireworks from different divisions can be transported together in a 
same compartment and next to each other in deck because groups G and S compatibility 
allow it. 
UN Number Designation Division Stowage category Meaning 
0333 Fireworks  1.1G Category 7 In closed containers above or below deck  
0334 Fireworks 1.2G Category 7 In closed containers above or below deck 
0335 Fireworks 1.3G Category 7 In closed containers above or below deck 
0336 Fireworks 1.4G Category 6 In closed containers above or below deck 
0337 Fireworks 1.4S Category 5 In closed containers above or below deck 
               
Figure 5: Containers above and below deck 
 
 
Protection against fire 
It is possible to intervene as soon as a fire event starts, if the fire fighting means are available 
and if it begins far from the explosive products. Regardless of the outcome of this original 
intervention that must keep of short duration, one must then evacuate. Generally, it is 
recommended not to intervene on a pyrotechnic facility on fire but; 
- to alarm, to warn the crew and to evacuate the area concerned or neighbour of the place of 
the disaster  
- to go away as soon as possible of the area and go to a rally point  
- In any case, staff members don’t have to fight a fire of explosive products. Only 
provisions to avoid a possible extension of the fire can be taken. Where this extension 
cannot be prevented, the secure zone must be maximized 
 Pyrotechnic products decompose without additional oxygen carrier from outside their 
formulation. This is what differentiates them with ordinary combustibles like oil and other 
flammable products; in addition they continue to react the same way under water which can 
sometimes even be a factor worsening if there is presence of fine metal powders.  
Water can be effective on small amounts of explosive products, in the case of a workshop for 
example but not in case of a storage fire. Water can also play a shield role so that the 
intervention teams specially equipped to intervene to save people; it also allows you to cool 
the surrounding installations to avoid rapid extension of the fire.  
History has also shown that even if the fire appears to be mastered, extreme caution is still 
needed to allow for enough cooling time and be ready to cope with side reactions like cook-
off (initiation and violent breakdown of neighbouring explosive products by slow heating).  
Automatic (sprinklers or inert gases such as CO2) fire extinguishing systems are not effective 
on fireworks in boxes in a container, the fire may smouldering and pyrotechnic compositions 
do not need oxygen to work.  
Only a complete flooding of the fireworks can be effective, which is possible in a cargo ship 
but very long compared to the reactivity of a fireworks fire, once detected.  
CONCLUSIONS IN TERMS OF SAFE PRINCIPLES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF 
FIREWORKS ON A CARGO SHIP 
Recommendations target both filling fireworks in maritime containers and container loading 
and stowing on the container ship. 
1/ proceed to pertinent fireworks classification regarding Transportation of 
Dangerous Goods: the first recommendation concerns the classification of the fireworks. 
The only way to get a secured classification is asking to the sender the risk division of 
fireworks issued by the transmitting competent authority (which is for the time being only 
required by the ADR and not by the IMDG).  
2/ limit the quantities: the second recommendation is then to limit the quantities loaded to 
limit the effects in the event of accidental scenarios,  
3/ select an adequate packaging: the third recommendation is to ensure the quality 
uploads by choosing a type of packaging adapted to avoid moving material goods during 
stowage. These actions will help to reduce the probability of an accidental event and 
therefore limit related risks.  
4/ make use of suitable containers: a possibility is to use containers with fire walls able to 
contain a Fireworks fire. To our knowledge, there are no such containers that are in current 
use for maritime transportation, this type of fire resistant container is however in use for 
the storage of dangerous goods.  
5/ define a safe position for stowage fireworks containers on ship: in order to limit the 
thermal effects, we recommend to position the fireworks containers onside the deck and far 
from accommodation areas, and enclosed as far as possible with empty containers to limit 
the spread of the thermal effects (or to use special containers). Another possibility is the 
stowage below deck inside the first dock, if equipped with a rapid flooding system and fire 
detectors (inside containers). 
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